

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAIRO 16857 01 OF 02 071634Z

53

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSM-03 ACDA-07 CIAE-00 PM-04

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9501

INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 16857

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINR PINT PFOR EG

SUBJ: VIEWS OF THIRD ARMY COMMANDER MAJ. GENERAL AHMAD BADAWI

SUMMARY. ONE OF EGYPT'S LEADING MILITARY COMMANDERS, CO OF THIRD ARMY MG AHMAD BADAWI, DISCUSSED WIDE VARIETY OF SUBJECTS WITH STAFFDEL AND EMBOFFS. BADAWI'S MOST INTERESTING COMMENTS WERE ON EGYPTIAN STRATEGY AND HIS PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI TACTICS AND STRATEGY. HE WAS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF SOVIETS, FULL OF PRAISE FOR POLITICAL/MILITARY PLANNING AND COORDINATION UNDER SADAT, AND SAID EGYPTIANS, FROM MILITARY TO MAN IN STREET, FAVORED PEACE SINCE BOTH SIDES HAVE LOST MUCH AND NEITHER SIDE CAN DEFEAT THE OTHER. BADAWI ALSO DEMONSTRATED BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF AREA AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, E.G. HE IS CONVINCED THAT ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE CAN ONLY BE DURABLE IF ACCOMPANIED BY ARMS BALANCE IN SAME WAY THAT US AND USSR SEEK BALANCE TO STRENGTHEN DETENTE. END SUMMARY.

1. ON DECEMBER 4 STAFFDEL BRYEN/KRAFT, POLCOUNS AND DATT WERE GIVEN DAY LONG TOUR IN AREA OF THIRD ARMY, INCLUDING FORMER ISRAELI STRONGPOINT OF BAR LEV LINE AND HEAVILY REINFORCED BUNKER AT  
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PAGE 02 CAIRO 16857 01 OF 02 071634Z

UYON MUSA ALLEGEDLY USED BY ISRAELI ARTILLERY DURING WAR OF

ATTRITION TO BOMBARD SUEZ AND PORT TAWFIQ. VISIT PROVIDED RARE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WIDE VARIETY OF SUBJECTS WITH KEY MILITARY OFFICERS INCLUDING CO OF THIRD ARMY MAJOR GENERAL AHAMD BADAWI AND MAJOR GENERAL ABDUL SATTAR AMIN, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER OF NASSER MILITARY ACADEMY. OTHER OFFICERS PAID DEFERENCE TO BADAWI AND HE DID MUCH OF THE TALKING, USUALLY THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, ALTHOUGH HIS ENGLISH IS SERVICEABLE.

2. BIO NOTE: GENERAL BADAWI IS ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, HEAVY OF BUILD BUT NOT YET CORPULENT. HE HAS AN ENGAGING AND FRIENDLY MANNER. HE ENTERED THE ARMY IN 1948 AND HAS SERVED CONTINUOUSLY WITH EXCEPTION OF 1967-71 WHEN HE WAS FIRED BY NASSER, ALONG WITH ABOUT 70 OTHER OFFICERS INCLUDING MG AMIN, AS ONE OF SCAPEGOATS FOR 1967 DEBACLE. BADAWI SPENT ONE YEAR IN JAIL AND FOUR YEARS AS A CIVILIAN DURING WHICH HE WENT TO THE FACULTY OF COMMERCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CAIRO. HE WAS REHABILITATED ALONG WITH MOST OF HIS COLLEAGUES BY PRESIDENT SADAT IN 1970 OR 1971. DURING THE OCTOBER WAR HE WAS A DIVISION COMMANDER WITH THE 3RD ARMY AND WENT ACROSS IN THE FOURTH WAVE OF TROOPS. BADAWI SAID FIRST WAVES, WHICH TOOK ISRAELI STONGPOINTS BEFORE ARRIVAL OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT SUFFERED 60 PERCENT CASUALTIES. HE ATTRIBUTED THEIR COURAGE AND SUCCESS TO FACT THAT COMPANY COS WENT IN FIRST WAVE, BN COS IN 2 ND WAVE, GRIGADE COS IN 3RD WAVE AND DIV COS IN 4TH WAVE. FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF THE MORE INTERESTING COMMENTS MADE BY BADAWI:

3. ISRAELI STRATEGY. ISRAELI STRATEGY SINCE 1948 HAS BEEN TO CONVINCE ONE OR MORE FOREIGN POWERS THAT ISRAEL SERVES THEIR INTERESTS; IN 1947/48 IT PERSUADED STALIN THAT ISRAEL COULD BE VANGUARD OF COMMUNISM IN ME; IN 1950S IT CONVINCED UK AND FRANCE THAT IT COULD STEM THE TIDE OF ARAB NATIONALISM PERSONIFIED BY NASSER AND ALGERIAN FLN; AND IN 1960'S IT TURNED TO US AS BASTION OF ANTI-COMMUNISM IN ME. IN FACT, CAUSE OF SOVIET PENETRATION HAS BEEN ISRAELI EXPANSIONIST THREAT. (WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT EGYPT TOO HAD RELIED ON FOREIGN POWERS IN PURSUING ITS STRATEGY, BADAWI RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT THE SAME SINCE EGYPT HAD BEEN FORCED TO DO SO IN ITS OWN DEFENSE.)

4. EGYPTIAN STRATEGY, PRIOR TO 1967 EGYPT HAD NO POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGY, ONLY THE THINKING AND WHIMS OF ONE MAN, NASSER. CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 CAIRO 16857 01 OF 02 071634Z

MILITARY FORCES WERE MOVED IN AND OUT OF SINAI IN 1967 WITH NO STRATEGIC GOAL IN MIND, BUT AS POLITICAL PLOY. ARMY ALWAYS OBEYED THESE ORDERS, BUT NECESSITY FOR A CLEAR CUT STRATEGY WAS ONE OF MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED IN 1967. TODAY, THERE IS A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHICH RESULTS IN HIGHLY EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. IN 1973 EGYPT'S STRATEGY HAD BEEN FIRST TO DESTROY ISRAELI CONCEPT OF "SECURE BORDERS" AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT PEACE COULD NOT BE HAD BY

OCCUPYING ARAB TERRITORY, AND SECONDLY, TO INFLICT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CASUALTIES ON ISRAEL. CAPTURE OF THE PASSES HAD NEVER BEEN A GOAL, BUT ONLY SEIZURE OF BAR LEV LINE AND THEN TO FIGHT DEFENSIVELY UNDER COVER OF MISSILE AIR DEFENSE. DESERT FRONT LIKE SEA, ARE NOT IMPORTANT, ONLY DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY. EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD DEVIATED FROM THIS STRATEGY AND MOVED FORWARD TOWARD THE PASSES ONLY AS RESULT OF POLITICAL DECISION TAKEN AT SYRIAN URGING AND IT PARTIALLY SUCCEEDED IN DRAWING OFF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM SYRIAN FRONT. TODAY NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL IS BODY UNDER PRESIDENT SADAT THAT FORMULATES A UNIFIED MILITARY/ECONOMIC/ POLITICAL STRATEGY AND IT IS WORKING WELL.

5. DECISION TO GO TO WAR IN '73. SADAT MADE DECISION IN NOVEMBER 1972 AND PLANNING BEGAN. PLANNERS HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH USSR SINCE EARLY 1960S HAD RESULTED IN SOVIETS GIVING MAINLY DEFENSIVE ARMS IN LIMITED AMOUNTS SO THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH FOR ATTACK. (AT SAME TIME, SOVIETS HAD EXTRACTED CONCESSIONS FROM EGYPT EACH STEP OF THE WAY.) GOALS OF '73 WAR WERE THEREFORE DETERMINED ON BASIS OF THESE CAPABILITIES AND ISRAELI STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES. ISRAELI STRATEGY ALWAYS BASED ON FIGHTING ARAB STATES ONE-BY-ONE AND EGYPT THEREFORE INSISTED ON A TWO FRONT WAR.

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 16857 02 OF 02 071647Z

53

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 16857

6. ISRAELI TACTIC OF INSTILLING FEAR. DURING WAR OF ATTRITION EGYPTIAN TROOPS HAD BEEN ATTACHED OFTEN BY AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO MAKE THEM FEARFUL AND TO SOME EXTENT IT WORKED. MOST DANGEROUS THING ABOUT AIR SUPERIORITY IS EFFECT ON MORALE OF THE TROOPS, NOT ACTUAL DAMAGE. FOR THIS REASON, SUCCESSFUL USE OF THE STRELLA MISSILE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF OCTOBER WAR IN BRINGING DOWN LOW FLYING ISRAELI A/C WAS IMMEASURABLY BENEFICIAL FOR MORALE. FOURTEEN A/C HAD BEEN DOWNED IN ONE DAY BY GENERAL BADAWI'S DIVISION. ISRAELI USE OF AIR AND NAZI BLITZKRIEG TACTICS WITH ARMOR TO INSTILL FEAR IS ALSO TRUE OF ITS PROPAGANDA AS "INVINCIBLE FIGHTING FORCE," ETC. THIS IS SAME TACTIC USED BY TARTARS UNDER GHENGIS KHAN. ISRAELIS SHOULD REMEMBER THAT ALTHOUGH STRATEGY WORKED WELL, EGYPT DEFEATED THE TARTARS.

7. ISRAELI CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS OF SINAI II. THERE HAVE BEEN NO VIOLATIONS. EGYPT HAS CONSTRUCTION WORKERS GOING IN TO LIMITED ARMAMENTS ZONE BY DAY ONLY, BUT THEY TAKE IN NO EQUIPMENT. EGYPT RESPECTS SINAI II. IF IT WANTED TO VIOLATE AGREEMENT IT WOULD NOT SEND IN ONE OR TWO BATTALIONS WHICH HAVE NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, IT COULD SEND IN FIVE DIVISIONS. MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WILL TAKE TIME TO DEVELOP, BUT SINCE SINAI I, NOW CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 16857 02 OF 02 071647Z

ALMOST THREE YEARS OLD, THERE HAS BEEN PEACE IN SINAI AND IT HAS PRODUCED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. EGYPTIANS ARE KNOWN FOR PEACE AND FROM MAN IN THE STREET TO THE SOLDIER THEY ARE READY FOR PEACE. AFTER 30 YEARS OF FIGHTING NOTHING HAS BEEN GAINED AND NEITHER SIDE CAN DEFEAT THE OTHER. MEANWHILE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING AND NEED PEACE. GENEVA CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR WILL PROVIDE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE.

8. TREATMENT OF POWS. IN 1967 WAR ISRAEL HAD TAKEN ANY POWS BUT EGYPT ONLY VERY FEW. ISRAELI TREATMENT HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH AND THEY KILLED MANY BY RUNNING OVER THEM WITH TANK TRACKS. BODIES WERE LEFT UNBURIED. IN OCTOBER '73 EGYPT HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO TROOPS TO TREAT POWS WELL. THEY HAD DONE SO; E.G. POWS TAKEN BY BADAWI'S BRIGADE HAD ASKED TO STAY UNDER HIS COMMAND RATHER THAN GO TO HOSPITAL OR INTERNMENT CAMPS IN CAIRO. AS RESULT, ISRAELIS HAD ALSO TREATED POWS WELL, GIVEN THEM MEDICAL CARE, AND BODIES RESPECTED ON BOTH SIDES. THIS SHOULD HELP TO ESTABLISH MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

9. FUTURE OF THE TANK. DURING OCTOBER WAR THE ANTI-TANK MISSILES WITH RANGE OF THREE KMS HAD INFLICTED LOTS OF DAMAGE ON ISRAELI TANKS. LESSONS LEARNED AND TANKS AND STRATEGY WILL NOW BE MODIFIED WITH HEAVIER ARMOR PLATING AND BY USE OF INFANTRY WITH TANKS. MISSILES WILL IMPROVE AND HISTORIC COMPETITION BETWEEN TANKS AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS WILL CONTINUE. TANK WILL CONTINUE TO BE MOST DECISIVE WEAPON ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IN 1973 ISRAELIS WERE

KNOWN TO BE DEPENDENT ON TANKS AND A/C ALONE AND EGYPTIAN STRATEGY WAS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS WEAKNESS. IN FUTURE, ISRAELIS WILL CERTAINLY HAVE COORDINATION AMONG TANKS, INFANTRY, ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT.

10. RUSSIAN ROLE. RUSSIANS WERE IN AREA BECAUSE OF CREATION OF ISRAEL AND THREAT IT PRESENTED TO ARABS. IN RELATIONS WITH ARABS, RUSSIANS HAD EXTRACTED CONCESSIONS FOR USE OF EGYPTIAN FACILITIES, HAD PROVIDED ONLY LIMITED QUANTITIES AND DEFENSIVE ARMS, CHEATED IN DELIVERIES (E.G. SENDING WATER TANK TRUCKS FULL OF WATER), AND, PARTICULARLY AFTER 1967, BEGUN ORDERING EGYPTIAN OFFICERS AROUND. FURTHERMORE, RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS HAD BEEN USED TO SPREAD COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AND IDEOLOGY. IF PEACE COMES TO ME THEY WILL NOT BE HARD TO GET RID OF, EVEN FROM IRAQ ASWHERE  
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PAGE 03 CAIRO 16857 02 OF 02 071647Z

ARE GOING AROUND SAYING "WHAT HAS US DONE FOR EGYPT AFTER THREE YEARS? MONEY IS BEING SPENT ONLY FOR BREAD AND CONSUMABLES, NOTHING TO SEE. WHY GO WITH THEM? USSR IS REAL FRIENDS OF THE ARABS." EVEN MEMBER OF FRENCH PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY DURING RECENT VISIT HAD ASKED MG AMIN DURING A BRIEFING, "WHAT HAVE YOU GOTTEN FROM AMERICA?" AMIN HAD CITED BENEFITS OF SINAI I AND II, NEW UNDERSTANDING FROM USG, \$1 BILLION IN AID, AND DENIAL OF CERTAIN SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO ISRAEL SUCH AS PERSHING MISSILE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE THOSE WHO SAY EGYPT MUST GO WITH US, THOSE WHO SAY EGYPT AND ARABS MUST GO WITH USSR, AND OTHERS WHO SAY EGYPT MUST SEEK A SOLUTION BY FORCE, THAT WHAT WAS TAKEN BY FORCE CAN ONLY BE TAKEN BACK BY FORCE. EGYPT HAS OPTED FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND THE MILITARY PREFERS THIS, IT IS CHEAPER. EVERY POINT OF VIEW SEEKS SOLUTION, IT IS ONLY METHOD OF ACHIEVEMENT THAT DIFFERS. IF US IS ABLE TO BRING PEACE TO AREA DISSIDENT FACTIONS WILL DISAPPEAR, I.E. REJECTIONISTS AND SOVIETS.

11. ARMS BALANCE. SOME KIND OF ARMS BALANCE WITH ISRAEL WILL BE REQUIRED IF PEACE IS TO BE DURABLE, IN SAME WAY THAT US AND USSR SEEK ARMS BALANCE TO ENSURE DETENTE.

12. ISRAELI CROSSING. MAJOR GENERAL AMIN, HEAD OF STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER AT NASSER ACADEMY, SAID IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION THAT ISRAELIS HAD BEEN ABLE TO PENETRATE TO WEST BANK FOR THREE REASONS: (A) FAILURE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD ARMIES; (B) AREA WHERE THEY LANDED (DEVERSOIR) WAS HEAVILY CULTIVATED AND THEY WERE ABLE TO DISPERSE QUICKLY AND HIDE WITHOUT REVEALING THEIR TRUE NUMBERS; AND (C) CREDIBILITY PROBLEM; EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE HAD DIFFICULTY IN BELIEVING ISRAELIS HAD DONE SUCH A THING.  
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